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BANKRUPTCY COURT 
JURISDICTION TO MODIFY 
ALIMONY PAYMENTS OF 
CHAPTER 13 DEBTORS 
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19781 revolutionized bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction by expanding it to encompass all civil ·pro-
ceedings "related to" the bankruptcy case.• Proceedings brought 
to modify a chapter 13 debtor's alimony payments "relate to" 
the chapter 13 case because any modification would have a di-
rect and immediate impact on the debtor's chapter 13 plan. 
Thus, the alimony modification proceedings should fall within 
the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. 
Traditionally, however, federal courts have had limited juris-
diction in matters pertaining to domestic relations.8 This limita-
tion is based on the premise that the states have an overriding 
interest in the area of domestic relations and that state courts 
are especially competent to administer state domestic relations 
law.' 
' Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified primarily at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-152326 
(Supp. III 1979)). 
Constitutionally, bankruptcy is subject to federal jurisdiction. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, 
cl. 4 (Congress shall have power to establish "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankrupt-
cies throughout the United States"). Federal jurisdiction has been exercised continually 
since enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544. This oft-amended 
Act was repealed and replaced by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. 
• 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (Supp. III 1979). Although most of the Bankruptcy Reform Act 
is codified as title 11 of the United States Code, and referred to as the Bankruptcy Code, 
the jurisdictional section is part of the Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Code. 
Bankruptcy' courts under the Bankruptcy Act were not independent courts but divi-
sions of the federal district courts. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, §§ 1-2, 30 Stat. 544-46 
(1898). The Reform Act creates independent bankruptcy courts which will come into 
existence on April 1, 1984. Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402(b), 92 Stat. 2682 (1978). The old 
court structure continues until then, but during the transition period from 1979 to 1984 
the old courts have the expanded jurisdiction of the independent courts. Id. § 405(b), 92 
Stat. at 2685. See generally Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Court Under the New Bank-
ruptcy Law: Its Structure and Jurisdiction, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 251 (1979), reprinted in 
55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 63 (1981). 
• The Supreme Court set forth the domestic relations limitation in Barber v. Barber, 
62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859), and federal courts have applied the limitation since then. 
See pt. I B infra. 
• 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3609 
587 
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This article examines a bankruptcy court's power to modify a 
chapter 13 debtor's alimony payments. Part I discusses the 
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction in chapter 13 cases and the con-
nection between the chapter 13 case and alimony modification 
proceedings. It then outlines the domestic relations limitation 
and the resulting conflict between bankruptcy courts and state 
courts with respect to alimony modification. Part II analyzes va-
rious arguments for and against allowing bankruptcy courts to 
hear alimony modification requests in chapter 13 cases. This 
analysis reveals that any state interests are far outweighed by 
the substantial benefits to be gained from consolidating the ali-
mony modification proceedings with the chapter 13 case in the 
bankruptcy court. 
I. THE JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICT BETWEEN BANKRUPTCY 
COURTS AND STATE COURTS REGARDING MODIFICATION OF A 
CHAPTER 13 DEBTOR'S ALIMONY PAYMENTS 
This section examines the scope of bankruptcy jurisdiction in 
chapter 13 cases vis a vis modification of the debtor's future ali-
mony obligation. The interdependence of the two proceedings 
establishes a prima facie case for bankruptcy court jurisdiction 
over both. The domestic relations limitation on federal court ju-
risdiction arguably prohibits bankruptcy courts from exercising 
their jurisdiction to modify alimony payments. However, analy-
sis of the limitation reveals that it is far from absolute and, in 
fact, is generally adhered to only when overriding state interests 
compel federal courts' abstention. 
A. Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction in Chapter 13 Cases 
1. Scope of the jurisdiction- Chapter 13 debtors are indi-
viduals with regular income whose debts do not exceed a speci-
fied amount.11 The debtor is able to avoid liquidation by promis-
ing to pay a portion of his disposable postpetition income to a 
trustee, who distributes appropriate shares to creditors pursuant 
to a court-approved plan.8 The debtor is discharged from most 
(1975) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT et al.]. 
• 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (Supp. III 1979) (noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts of 
less than $100,000, and noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of less than $350,000). 
• See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1977) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 
REP. No. 595], reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 5963, 6079; S. REP. No. 
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prepetition debts when payments under the plan are completed.' 
When a chapter 13 petition is filed, the bankruptcy court ac-
quires original and exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy case. 
The court also obtains "original but not exclusive jurisdiction of 
all civil proceedings ... related to [the chapter 13 case]."8 "Re-
lated to" is undefined in the statute; however, the House Report 
states that the new jurisdiction extends to "proceedings to which 
the debtor is a party if the outcome of the proceeding will have 
an impact on the case."9 In floor debate, this language was de-
scribed as giving the bankruptcy court jurisdiction "to resolve all 
disputes affecting the bankruptcy estate. "10 
2. Application of the jurisdictional standard to alimony 
modification- Alimony modification proceedings clearly meet 
this standard by affecting the plan and the estate. In every 
989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1978) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 989), reprinted in 
[1978) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5793-99. 
11 U.S.C. § 13O6(a) (Supp. III 1979) provides that in a chapter 13 case the property of 
the estate that is used to pay creditors includes not only the debtor's property at the 
time the petition is filed, see id. § 541, but also all property and earnings acquired by the 
debtor after the petition is filed. See S. REP. No. 989, supra, at 140-41. In chapter 13, the 
debtor is entitled to retain the property he has when the petition is filed, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1306(b) (Supp. III 1979), but the trustee receives all future earnings of the debtor 
necessary to execute the plan. Id. § 1322(a)(l). 
The debtor must be able to make all payments and comply with the plan before it can 
be confirmed. Id. § 1325(a)(6). Unsecured creditors cannot receive less than they would 
receive if the debtor's estate were liquidated under chapter 7 as of the effective date of 
the plan, id. § 1325(a)(4), but they can receive payments over a longer time period. Id. 
§ 1322(c). 
• 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (Supp. III 1979). 
• Id. § 1471, which reads in pertinent part: 
(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction 
on a court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall have 
original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 
11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11. 
(c) The bankruptcy court for the district in which a case under title 11 is 
commenced shall exercise all of the jurisdiction conferred by this section on the 
district courts. 
• H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 48-49. 
•• 123 CONG. REc. 35,449 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Butler). See also H.R REP. No. 595, 
supra note 6, at 544 (Separate Additional Views of Hon. George E. Danielson) language 
was "broadening the jurisdictional base to permit virtually any and all kinds of litigation 
to be tried before the bankruptcy courts") (quoting Judge Shirley M. Hufstedler); &nk-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 2266.and H.R. 8200 before the Subcomm. on 
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 832 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Hearings] (memorandum of the 
National Bankruptcy Conference) (supporting the language as giving the bankruptcy 
court "jurisdiction over any matter or lawsuit that affected the estate"); J. TROST, G. 
'l'REIBTER, L. FORMAN, K. KLEE & R. LEVIN, REsOURCE MATERIALS: THE NEW FEDERAL 
BANKRUPTCY CODE 47 (1979) [hereinafter cited as J. TROST et al.] (language gives bank-
ruptcy courts jurisdiction over matters in which "the estate could be expected to have an 
interest"). 
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chapter 13 confirmation hearing, the court must balance the 
debtor's prepetition assets and postpetition regular income with 
the debtor's expenses and the creditors' prepetition claims.11 Fu-
ture alimony payments are one of the debtor's expenses. 
However, alimony payments are not permanently fixed in 
amount by divorce decrees. The vast majority of states statuto-
rily permit modification of alimony.11 Changed financial circum-
stances constitutes one of the most common grounds for either 
ex-spouse to seek modification.18 A change includes a reduction 
or cessation of the payor spouse's income14 or an increase in the 
income of the payee spouse. u These and other possible grounds 
for modification could exist in the case of a chapter 13 debtor. 
Any such modification of alimony payments by a chapter 13 
debtor directly affects the debtor's plan. If the alimony payment 
is decreased through modification, the debtor's expenses change 
correspondingly and a greater share of the regular income be-
comes available for creditors. 
The operation of the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provi-
sion18 further highlights the interdependence of the chapter 13 
and alimony modification proceedings. When an ex-spouse peti-
tions a state court to increase the payor spouse's alimony pay-
ments, filing of the payor's chapter 13 petition automatically 
stays the state court proceedings.17 This enables the debtor to 
11 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1325(a)(6) (Supp. III 1979). 
11 Forty-three states and the District of Columbia statutorily permit modification of 
alimony. Two states allow modification at common law, and two other states allow it 
only if the parties have so agreed. See Note, Modification of Spousal Support: A Survey 
of a Confusing Area of the Law, 17 J. FAM. L. 711, 719-21 (1978-79). 
18 See Note, Domestic Relations: Modification of Future Alimony Payments Due to 
Changed Circumstances, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 66 (1980); Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 10, 16 °(1951); 
e.g., 23 PA. STAT. ANN. § 501(e) (Purdon's Pa. Leg. Service 1980) ("Any order entered 
pursuant to this section [permitting the granting of alimony] is subject to further order 
of the court upon changed circumstances of either party of a substantial and continuing 
nature whereupon such order may be modified, suspended, terminated, reinstituted, or a 
new order made."). 
14 E.g., In re Marriage of Acosta, 67 Cal. App. 3d 899, 137 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1977); Denny 
v. Denny, 334 So. 2d 300 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Barrow v. Barrow, 33 Ill. App. 3d 
654, 342 N.E.2d 237 (1975); Bellamy v. Bellamy, 572 S.W.2d 220 (Mo. App. 1978); Ridge 
v. Ridge, 542 P.2d 189 (Utah 1975). 
'" E.g., Hornbaker v. Hornbaker, 25 Ariz. App. 577, 545 P.2d 425 (1976); Mumm v. 
Mumm, 353 So. 2d 134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Broday v. Broday, 43 Ill. App. 3d 628, 
357 N.E.2d 128 (1976); Jarvis v. Jarvis, 218 Kan. 679, 544 P.2d 1384 (1976); Ferrara v. 
Ferrara 320 So. 2d 287 (La. App. 1975); Ellis v. Ellis, 135 Vt. 83, 370 A.2d 200 (1977). 
,. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (Supp. III 1979). . 
17 The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code stays all entities from the 
commencement or continuation of any proceeding against the debtor or to recover a 
prepetition claim against the debtor, or from any act to obtain possession of property of 
the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(l), (3) (Supp. III 1979). However, the automatic stay does 
not apply to the collection of alimony from property that is not property of the estate. 
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complete a plan designed to accomodate his present alimony 
payments. The bankruptcy court cannot anticipate future modi-
fication by a state court when it confirms a plan. If no automatic 
stay were in effect, the state court's granting of the ex-spouse's 
request for increased alimony payments would upset the as-
sumptions on which the plan was confirmed and thereby affect 
the chapter 13 case. 
Thus, the impact of alimony modification on the chapter 13 
case is readily apparent.18 Because they "relate to" the chapter 
13 case, alimony modification proceedings fall within the scope 
of the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. Bankruptcy courts should 
not hesitate to exercise this new jurisdiction unless counter-
vailing policy considerations compel abstention. 
Id. § 362(b)(2), and the ex-spouse can also collect prepetition and postpetition alimony 
from the debtor's exempt property. Id. § 522(c). Normally there is little such collectable 
property or it is secured by various liens. The debtor's regular income is the most likely 
source available for collection proceedings, but in chapter 13 this is property of the es-
tate. See note 7 supra. Therefore, the collection proceeding is stayed. See In re Lovett, 6 
Bankr. Rep. 270 (Bankr. Ct. D. Utah 1980); Cox, Family Law Newsletter: Bankruptcy 
and Divorce, 9 COLO. LAW. 1181, 1182 (1980). 
But see In re Garrison, 5 Bankr. Rep. 256 (Bankr. Ct. E.D. Mich 1980), in which the 
court allowed a state agency to proceed in state court against a chapter 13 debtor's 
postpetition earnings to compel continuation of child support payments. The court held 
that the automatic stay did not apply to the case, on the grounds that "property of the 
estate" as used for automatic stay purposes did not include postpetition property added 
to the term "property of the estate" by chapter 13. 
The court's interpretation is poorly reasoned. The court admits that good faith re-
quires the plan to provide for alimony or support in order to be confirmed. Id. at 260 n.7. 
In order to confirm the plan, the court could require payment of all accrued alimony or 
child support from the time the petition was filed until the plan was confirmed. The 
legislative history states, "[T]he commencement of a chapter 13 case operates as a stay 
of all actions by creditors against the debtor or his property. The stay provides the 
debtor with the necessary breathing spell to arrange his financial affairs for a repayment 
plan." H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 121 (footnote omitted). The Garrison decision 
flies in the face of this "necessary breathing spell" on the grounds that nondis-
chargeability of the child support debt compels the continuation of payments and no 
stay. However, the good faith requirement, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (Supp. III 1979), pro-
vides the bankruptcy court with the necessary discretion to avoid any problems posed by 
nonpayment. Additionally, the decision ignores the court's responsibility to determine 
nondischargeability and the extent of property of the estate, factors that are crucial to 
the bankruptcy case and the alimony or support payments. Finally, the court can always 
lift the stay for cause. Id. § 362(d). For these reasons, "property of the estate" should not 
be given the limited interpretation of Garrison. 
18 This contrasts with a chapter 7 liquidation, in which the court only concerns itself 
with prepetition debts and assets. For example, unmatured alimony claims may not be 
paid out of property of the estate, 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6) (Supp. III 1979), and are not 
accounted for in the chapter 7 plan, but a court must take such claims into account in 
confirming a chapter 13 plan. See id. § 1325(a)(6). Therefore, although one of the pur-
poses of chapter 7 plans is to give the debtor a fresh start, see note 32 and accompanying 
text infra, this purpose extends only to prepetition financial affairs. A chapter 7 case's 
"relation to" alimony modification is consequently much weaker than that of a chapter 
13 case. 
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B. The Domestic Relations Limitation on Federal Court 
Jurisdiction 
More than a century ago the Supreme Court disclaimed "any 
jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the subject. 
of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony."19 The Court has 
reiterated this policy concerning federal jurisdiction in several 
instances. 20 The domestic relations limitation now stands as a 
judicially created exception to the exercise of the power of the 
federal courts. 21 Lower courts often decline jurisdiction on this 
basis.22 
However, despite the fact that the Supreme Court has stated 
the domestic relations limitation in sweeping terms, as applying 
to all federal court jurisdiction,28 the potentially broad nature of 
the limitation has been narrowly confined. 24 Federal courts rou-
tinely hear certain cases dealing with domestic relations. These 
include actions to enforce alimony decrees, to collect damages 
11 Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1859). The Court held that a Wiscon-
sin federal district court could enforce a New York alimony decree when the ex-husband 
moved to Wisconsin and stopped paying alimony while his ex-wife remained in New 
York. The Court held that a federal court could act as a court of equity to prevent the 
alimony decree from being defeated by fraud. Id. at 591. Because the Court found the 
exercise of jurisdiction justified, the statement regarding the federal court's lack of juris-
diction was dictum. 
•• In Popovici v. Alger, 280 U.S. 397 (1930), the Court held that the constitutional 
grant of jurisdiction to federal courts in cases affecting ambassadors and counsels, along 
with a federal law giving federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over such cases, did not 
deny an Ohio state court the jurisdiction to grant a divorce to a wife whose husband was 
a Romanian vice counsel and claimed exclusive federal jurisdiction. See also Simms v. 
Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899) ("the Circuit Courts of the United States have no juris-
diction, either of suits for divorce, or of claims for alimony, whether made in a suit for 
divorce, or by an original proceeding in equity, before a decree for such alimony in a 
state court") (citing Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859) and In re Burrus, 
136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1980)); De la Rama v. De la Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 307 (1906) ("It 
has been a long established rule that the courts of the United States have no jurisdiction 
upon the subject of divorce, or of the allowance of alimony .... "). 
11 For recent reiterations of the domestic relations limitation by the Court, see Tram-
mel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975). 
11 E.g., Wilkins v. Rogers, 581 F.2d 399 (4th Cir. 1978); Overman v. United States, 563 
F.2d 1287 (8th Cir. 1977); Bossom v. Bossom, 551 F.2d 474 (2d Cir. 1976); Solomon v. 
Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1975). 
•• See notes 19-21 and accompanying text supra . 
.. See Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486,487 (5th Cir. 1978) (court acknowledged limita-
tion but refused to apply it in suit to enforce separation agreement made long after 
actual separation); Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 
514-15 (2d Cir. 1973) (court acknowledged limitation but refused to apply it where law 
firm sued ex-husband for fees for services rendered to ex-wife during marital dispute). 
See also Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1025 (3d Cir. 1975) (court applied limita-
tion where ex-wife filed diversity suit to enforce separation agreement; dictum that if 
factors differed, limitation would be inapplicable). 
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caused by a spouse's tortious conduct, to determine the invalid-
ity of a divorce decree on grounds of fraud or lack of jurisdic-
tion, and to remedy failure to give full faith and credit to a pre-
vious decree. 211 
Moreover, the domestic relations limitation has been criticized 
as being ill-founded and based on inaccurate historical 
grounds.28 Consequently, federal courts generally weigh all the 
factors involved before invoking this limitation. 27 
The expansive scope of the new bankruptcy jurisdiction con-
flicts with the traditional domestic relations limitation on fed-
eral court jurisdiction/as But the domestic relations limitation is 
not absolute; it is meant to apply only when state interests are 
strong enough to compel federal abstention. Thus, resolution of 
this conflict involves a balancing of interests. The next section 
examines federal bankruptcy policy considerations that call for 
bankruptcy courts to exercise their jurisdiction over alimony 
modification in chapter 13 cases. It then balances these interests 
against traditional state concerns which underly the domestic 
16 Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402 (1952) (enforcement of alimony decree); Spindel v. 
Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (tort action); McNeil v. McNeil, 78 F. 834 
(C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897), aff'd, 170 F. 289 (9th Cir. 1909) (fraud); Rapoport v. Rapoport, 416 
F.2d 41, 43 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970) (lack of jurisdiction); Wil-
liams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945) (full faith and credit). See also WRIGHT et 
al., supra note 4, at § 3609. 
16 See Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 808-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) where the court 
made several arguments against the limitation: English Chancery had jurisdiction over 
some divorce and alimony matters, so there is a historical basis for equity jurisdiction; 
even though the S.lpreme Court has said jurisdiction is limited, this was dictum in cases 
where the Court enforced divorce decrees or heard divorce appeals from territorial 
courts; federal courts would not be interfering with state law but following it; and a 
unitary administration of law requires federal courts to exercise jurisdiction in some 
matters. See also Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1031 (3d Cir. 1975) (Gibbons, J. 
dissenting); Vestal & Foster, Implied Limitations on the Diversity Jurisdiction of Fed-
eral Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 1, 23-31 (1956); 35 BROOKLYN L. REv. 313 (1969); 72 DICK 
L. REv. 692 (1968); 54 lowA L. REv. 390 (1968); 28 Mn. L. REv. 376 (1968); 14 N.Y.L.F. 
363 (1968); 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 631 (1969). 
" See Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1978) (where none of the rationales for 
the limitation apply, it should not be invoked); Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1025 
(3d Cir. 1975) (dictum that different balance of factors could render limitation inappli-
cable); Brandtscheit v. Britton, 239 F. Supp. 652, 654 (N.D. Cal. 1965) (application of the 
limitation should be based on "sound policy considerations in the light of the circum-
stances within which litigants find themselves"); Note, Federal Jurisdiction of "Domes-
tic Relations" Cases, 7 J. FAM. L. 309 (1967) (discUBBes several factors that could out-
weigh the limitation). 
16 Compare Cox, supra note 17, at 1182 (1980) ("The Bankruptcy Court now has con-
current jurisdiction with the state courts of marital dissolution proceedings if the pro-
ceedings are filed after the bankruptcy case is begun."), with J. TROST et al., supra note 
10, at 47 ("No doubt the bankruptcy court ... still cannot grant a debtor a divorce or . 
otherwise act with respect to his personal relationships of a non-bankruptcy related 
nature .... "), and 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1l 3.01, at 3-46, 3-72 (15th ed. 1979). 
594 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 14:3 
relations limitation. 
II. BALANCING FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY POLICY AND STATE 
INTEREST IN ALIMONY MODIFICATION 
A. The Case for Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction 
Congress enlarged the scope of bankruptcy jurisdiction so that 
the judiciary could effectively implement federal bankruptcy 
policy. The objectives of federal bankruptcy law include resolv-
ing the debtor's financial difficulties, providing the debtor with 
an economic fresh start, and promoting judicial efficiency and 
economy. Where a chapter 13 debtor has future alimony obliga-
tions, these policy objectives are frustrated unless the bank-
ruptcy court has jurisdiction over any alimony modification 
proceedings. 
1. Congressional intent to expand bankruptcy jurisdiction-
The bankruptcy court has jurisdiction over any civil proceeding 
"related to" the bankruptcy case. Other than the "related to" 
standard, the statute places no express or implied limitation on 
the court's jurisdiction. The legislative history of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978 reveals that the new jurisdictional 
language was intended to grant bankruptcy courts whatever per-
sonal and in rem jurisdiction they require in order to handle 
bankruptcy cases fairly and expeditiously, along with the power 
to grant effective relief by disposing of matters related to the 
case.29 The reform's purpose is to eliminate the great cost and 
delay that resulted under the old jurisdictional standard and to 
achieve the prompt return of the debtor to financial equilib-
.. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 48-49, 52, 445. 
Bankruptcy jurisdiction was previously distinguished as summary or plenary. Sum-
mary jurisdiction consisted of matters relating to the administration of the estate, issues 
dealing with property actually or constructively in the court's possession, and issues in 
which the parties had consented to jurisdiction. Bankruptcy courts exercised summary 
jurisdiction. Federal district or state courts exercised plenary jurisdiction which con-
sisted of all other matters. Identifying those matters in which the bankruptcy court 
could exercise jurisdiction proved to be one of the most intricate and litigated questions 
in bankruptcy cases. Id. at 43. 
It is not the purpose of this article to examine the distinction between summary and 
plenary jurisdiction. For discussion of the distinction, see 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPl'CY 
,r 3.01 (15 ed. 1979); REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAws OF THB 
UNITED STATES, pt. I, at 88-89 (H.R. Doc. No. 93-137 (1973)), reprinted in Appendix 3A 
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (15th ed. 1979). 
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rium.80 Judicial decisions have broadly interpreted "related to" 
to meet these goals. 81 
Thus, when it expanded the scope of bankruptcy jurisdiction, 
Congress did not expressly or impliedly restrict a bankruptcy 
court's power to exercise jurisdiction over alimony modification 
proceedings where such proceedings relate to or a.ff ect a chapter 
13 case. In fact, congressional intent apparently mandates such 
action if necessary to a.ffectuate federal bankruptcy policy. 
2. Bankruptcy policy objectives- Chapter 13 is designed to 
provide a simple yet effective system for individuals to resolve 
their financial difficulties and pay their debts under bankruptcy 
court protection and supervision. Ultimately, the goal is to pro-
vide the debtor with an economic fresh start. Corollary objec-
tives are to resolve the debtor's financial difficulties efficiently 
and inexpensively, and to promote judicial economy. Jurisdic-
tion over alimony modification is essential to the attainment of 
these objectives in chapter 13 cases. 
a. Fresh start- One of the most important goals of bank-
ruptcy is to provide the debtor with an economic fresh start.81 
The fresh start results from the discharge of most of the debtor's 
prepetition debts as the final step of the bankruptcy proceed-
ings. The debtor then can begin economic life anew with relative 
financial stability. In chapter 13, however, the debtor does not 
80 H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 43. 
11 At least two cases have held that the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction when a rea-
sonable nexus exists between the bankruptcy case and the civil proceeding. In re Bazan, 
6 Bankr. Rep. 937, 940 (Bankr. Ct. N.D. Ill. 1980); In re Thompson, 3 Bankr. Rep. 312, 
313 (Bankr. Ct. D.S.D. 1980); see 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11 3.01, at 3-46 (15th ed. 
1979). 
An even broader test was articulated in In re Tidwell, 4 Bankr. Rep. 100, 102 (Bankr. 
Ct. N.D. Tex. 1980), which held that the relationship was met if the debtor was a party 
to both the state court action and the bankruptcy case. See McNutt, The New Bank-
ruptcy Court Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 - The District Court's Little 
Brother Grows Up, 39 FED. B.J. 62, 80 (1980) ("Even if the dispute merely involves the 
debtor, without being pertinent or essential to the bankruptcy proceeding, or merely re-
lates to a bankruptcy proceeding, the bankruptcy court not only has jurisdiction, it has 
original jurisdiction."). But see Dunne, Editor's Headnotes, 98 BANKING L.J. 3, 3 (1981) 
(civil proceedings should not be within bankruptcy court jurisdiction "unless presenting 
the clear and present danger of subverting the historic bankruptcy polestars of expedi-
tious procedure, creditor parity, and debtor fresh start"). 
u Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 648 (1971) ("This Court on numerous occasions 
has stated that '[o]ne of the primary purposes of the bankruptcy act' is to give debtors 'a 
new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure 
and discouragement of preexisting debt.'") (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 
234, 244 (1934); see Kennedy, Reflections on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States: 
The Debtor's Fresh Start, 76 W. VA. L. REv. 427 (1974); Rendleman, The Bankruptcy 
Discharge: Toward a Fresher Start, 58 N.C. L. REv. 723 (1980). Congress intended the 
Bankruptcy Code to continue fulfilling this fresh start purpose. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 
supra note, 6 at 118. 
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receive a discharge when the court confirms the plan. Only when 
payments under the plan are completed, which may take up to 
three years,33 is a discharge granted34 and the fresh start 
achieved. 
The debtor does, however, get an interim fresh start as soon as 
his chapter 13 plan is confirmed, because if he follows the plan 
he stands on stable financial terms. His regular income is budg-
eted to pay his expenses and creditors' claims. If successful, the 
plan's principles should extend beyond its term.811 Therefore, 
fresh start in chapter 13 does not just mean discharge, but also 
the economic stability that accompanies the effective allocation 
of resources. 
By declining to exercise its jurisdiction to modify alimony, a 
bankruptcy court denies the debtor this economic stability and 
interim fresh start. Of course, the option of petitioning a state 
court for alimony modification remains open to a debtor in need 
of such modification to achieve financial stability; but this alter-
native involves additional expense and delay for an individual 
who can afford neither.38 
More importantly, the state court's examination of the 
debtor's financial position depends on the outcome of the bank-
ruptcy proceedings. Because the portion of the debtor's regular 
income available to meet his needs is determined by the chapter 
13 plan, the state court would be unable to determine the 
debtor's available income until after the bankruptcy court con-
·firmed the plan. If the state court modifies the debtor's alimony 
payments after confirmation of the plan, this would upset the 
assumptions on which the plan was based. As a result, the 
debtor might be forced to modify his plan. 37 When the bank-
ruptcy court fails to exercise jurisdiction the debtor becomes 
trapped in a vicious circle of modification and his interim fresh 
start disappears in this jurisdictional maze. 
b. Effective resolution of the debtor's financial circum-
stances- Wage earner relief has been available to consumer 
debtors since 1938, when Congress added chapter XIII to the 
•• See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (Supp. III 1979) (payment period of up to three years al-
lowed, or five years if cause shown). 
14 Id. § 1328. 
•a See Note, The Wage Earner Plan - A Superior Alternative to Straight Bank-
ruptcy, 9 UTAH L. REV. 730, 737 (1965). 
88 A purpose of the new law was to end "needless and expensive" litigation over juris-
diction in "an area of law in which time is of the essence." H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 
6,_at 43; see In re G. Weeks Securities, 3 Bankr. Rep. 215, 217-18 (Bankr. Ct. W.D. Tenn. 
1980). 
•• Modification of a chapter 13 plan is permitted by 11 U.S.C. § 1329 (Supp. III 1979). 
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Bankruptcy Act of 1898. 88 The Bankruptcy Reform Act 
amended chapter XIII extensively and redesignated it as chap-
ter 13. 89 The encouragement of more eligible debtors to opt for 
wage earner relief and to make chapter 13 a more effective tool 
of bankruptcy relief provided the motive for the change.'0 
Providing effective bankruptcy relief anticipates complete 
resolution of the debtor's financial circumstances. Arriving at a 
comprehensive plan to rehabilitate the debtor and start him on 
the way to financial stability involves a considerable commit-
ment of time, money, and judicial resources. If one unresolved 
factor of the debtor's financial circumstances can bring down a 
plan constructed by the debtor and the court, this effort is 
wasted and the purpose of the Code not achieved. 
When a debtor files a chapter 13 petition, it is likely that his 
financial circumstances have deteriorated. Such a change in 
financial circumstances is a probable ground for modification of 
alimony paid by the debtor.'1 If a state court reviews a request 
for alimony modification before the debtor's plan is confirmed 
by the bankruptcy court, then the state court, aware of the 
bankruptcy proceedings, bases its decision on what the debtor's 
financial circumstances will be after the plan is confirmed. If, 
however, the bankruptcy court deviates from the course as-
sumed by the state court, one of two situations will arise. Either 
the debtor will be unable to make adequate payments to both 
his creditors and his ex-spouse, or the debtor will receive a wind-
fall at the expense of his creditors. In either case, the work of 
one of the courts will be frustrated. 
The bankruptcy court cannot confirm a chapter 13 plan unless 
the· debtor is able to meet certain minimum-payment require-
ments.'2 If the debtor's income is such that he is able to make 
18 Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, 930 (1938) (repealed 1978). 
19 See Merrick, Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 56 DEN. L.J. 585 
(1979); Pickard, The New Bankruptcy Code, Part I: A Review of Some of the Signifi-
cant Changes in Bankruptcy Law, 10 MEM. ST. L. REV. 177, 202-05 (1980). 
•• H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 116-18. 
u See note 13 supra. 
•• There are minimum requirements with respect to both secured and unsecured 
debts. With respect to allowed secured claims, unless the holder of the claim accepts a 
lesser amount in discharge of its claim, the debtor must either surrender the property 
securing the claim to the holder of the claim, or propose payments under the plan equal 
to the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of the secured claim, as determined 
under 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (Supp. III 1979). With respect to un-
secured claims, the debtor must propose to make payments to unsecured creditors that 
will equal an amount not less than they would have been paid on their claims if the 
estate of the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 as of the effective date of the plan. 
Id. § 1325(a)(4). 
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the minimum payments with little to spare, the effect of an in-
crease in alimony payments might be to preclude him from ob-
taining chapter 13 relief. The debtor's only alternative would be 
liquidation, the least desirable form of bankruptcy relief.0 If, on 
the other hand, the bankruptcy court approves a plan that pro-
vides for payments smaller than the state court anticipated, the 
state court's goal of setting a reasonable level of alimony is 
thwarted, because, had it known that the debtor would have 
more disposable income, it might have allowed a larger increase 
in alimony. 
Similarly, if the state court modifies alimony after the plan is 
confirmed, the result produces either windfall or hardship for 
the debtor. If the alimony payments are decreased, the debtor is 
unlikely to modify his chapter 13 plan to reflect the sudden in-
crease in available income.44 No provision allows the debtor's 
creditors to petition for modification of the plan.411 Thus, the 
creditors receive less than they might have under the circum-
stances, and the debtor receives more than just effective bank-
ruptcy relief - he gets a windfall. 
If, however, the state court increases the debtor's alimony 
payments after the plan is confirmed, the debtor suffers a hard-
ship. At best, assuming that the debtor's income will allow it, he 
will be able to modify his plan and avoid liquidation. Nonethe-
less, because he will have suffered through an additional court 
case and an unnecessarily prolonged bankruptcy case, the cost to 
him in terms of expense and delay will be far greater than the 
drafters of the Code anticipated."8 At worst, the debtor's income 
will not permit him to meet both his increased alimony pay-
ments and the chapter 13 minimum payments to creditors, and 
his only alternative is liquidation. 
The crux of the problem is that two courts are trying to re-
solve one problem, i.e., the debtor's financial situation. Only one 
court can do so effectively, and that court is the bankruptcy 
court. 
c. Judicial economy- The similarity of fact-finding between 
the modification case and the bankruptcy case calls for the exer-
cise of expanded bankruptcy jurisdiction. In confirming a chap-
ter 13 plan, a bankruptcy court must consider four factors: the 
debtor's regular income, assets, regular expenses, and debts."7 
•• H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 118. 
" 11 U.S.C. § 1329 (Supp. III 1979) allows modification of the plan after confirmation. 
•• See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ,r 1329.01[1), at 1329-3 n.12 (15th ed. 1979). 
" See note 36 supra. 
" See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 123-25 (discussing the factors that go into 
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Every chapter 13 plan must realistically budget for these needs 
and expenses before the court will confirm it."8 If the debtor ap-
pears unable to meet his own needs and expenses, the court 
presumes that he will be unable to complete the plan and the 
court will not confirm it.49 Thus, a bankruptcy court exercises 
broad discretion in examining a debtor's financial and personal 
situation, as well as the situation of his dependents, to deter-
mine the appropriate financial needs of the debtor and his 
family. 110 
When a state court reviews a request to modify alimony, it 
conducts a similar review of financial needs and expenses.111 
Therefore, the fact-finding that a bankruptcy court conducts in 
chapter 13 cases parallels the review it would conduct if it exer-
cised jurisdiction to modify alimony payments. The only differ-
ence appears to be that in modification cases the state court also 
reviews the financial needs and circumstances of the payee 
spouse, while in bankruptcy cases the court accepts the amount 
of alimony as representative of the ex-spouse's needs. 
This apparent difference vanishes, however, in light of the 
bankruptcy court's power to modify a claim for prepetition ali-
mony. The bankruptcy court has the power to review creditors' 
claims to determine whether and to what extent they will be al-
the makeup of a plan). 
" 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (Supp. III 1979) requires that "the debtor will be able to 
make all payments under the plan and to comply with the plan." 
•• See, e.g., In re Barnes, 5 Bankr. Rep. 376 (Bankr. Ct. D.D.C. 1980) (debtor had $749 
monthly income and $658 monthly expenses; plan that proposed $91 monthly payment 
to creditors not confirmed because it provided insufficiently for inflation or miscellane-
ous expenses); In re Hockaday, 3 Bankr. Rep. 254 (Bankr. Ct. S.D. Cal. 1980) (plan that 
provided $10 monthly cushion for expenses but failed to budget medical expenses and 
budgeted insufficiently for utilities not confirmed); In re Lucas, 3 Bankr. Rep. 252 
(Bankr. Ct. S.D. Cal. 1980) (plan that provided $2 monthly cushion for expenses but 
budgeted inadequately for medical and clothing expenses not confirmed); H.R. REP. No. 
595, supra note 6, at 124. See also 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ,i 1325.01[2)[F], at 1325-30 
(15th ed. 1979). 
00 The task of examining the debtor's financial situation falls not on the judge, but on 
the trustee, who has the responsibility for conducting such an examination and appear-
ing at the hearing on confirmation of the plan. 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(3), 1302(b). The trustee 
is advised that this task cannot be discharged simply by accepting the debtor's version of 
his financial plight but requires at least a meeting with the debtor and review of his 
situation. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ,i 1302.0l[l][A][x], at 1302-13 (15th ed. 1979). The 
task may be performed by a standing trustee whom the court is free to appoint. 11 
U.S.C. § 702(d) (Supp. III 1979). The bankruptcy judge remains free to apply his own 
standard of reasonableness to the plan. See note 49 supra. 
•• The review is normally not conducted by the judge, but by an agency that assists 
the judge in such matters. For instance, in Michigan the Friend of the Court reviews all 
requests to modify alimony and makes a recommendation to the judge. See 5 MICH. 
JUDICIAL COUNCIL ANN. REP. 115-17 (1935). 
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lowed. H The bankruptcy court uses this power to review a 
debtor's divorce decree to determine what constitutes alimony or 
a property settlement under the decree. 113 A property settlement 
is dischargeable, but prepetition alimony is not. M If the court 
finds that a decree grants a property settlement even though it 
terms the settlement alimony, the court may discharge that 
debt.611 The court bases this determination on federal bank-
ruptcy law, not state law.66 In this manner, the bankruptcy court 
indirectly modifies prepetition alimony when it finds that a 
portion of the alimony represents a dischargeable property 
settlement. 67 
The bankruptcy court routinely examines the financial situa-
tion of the debtor's ex-spouse when it reviews a claim for prepe-
tition alimony.68 Although cases may occur where a debtor seeks 
"" A party in interest must object to a claim for the court to conduct such a review. 11 
U.S.C. § 502(a) (Supp. III 1979). 
"" In re Lovett, 6 Bankr. Rep. 270 (Bankr. Ct. D. Utah 1980). See also H.R. REP. No. 
595, supra note 6, at 364; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 6, at 79. 
"' 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (Supp. III 1979). 
66 In re Warner, 5 Bankr. Rep. 434, 442 (Bankr. Ct. D. Utah 1980); In re Williams, 3 
Bankr. Rep. 401 (Bankr. Ct. N.D. Ga. 1980); see Branca, Dischargeability of Financial 
Obligations in Divorce: the Support Obligation and the Division of Marital Property, 9 
FAM. L.Q. 405 (1975); Loiseaux, Domestic Obligations in Bankruptcy, 41 N.C.L. REv. 27 
(1962); Schiffer, The New Bankruptcy Reform Act: Its Implications for Family Law 
Practitioners, 19 J. FAM. L. 1, 22 & n.93 (1980-81); Swann, Dischargeability of Domestic 
Obligations in Bankruptcy, 43 TENN. L. R.Ev. 231 (1976); Note, Dissolution of Marriage 
and the Bankruptcy Act of 1973: "Fresh Start" Forgotten, 52 IND. 'L.J. 469 (1977); Note, 
The Effect of the Indiana Divorce Law upon the Application of Section 17a(7) of the 
Bankruptcy Act, 12 IND. L. REV. 379 (1979). 
.. See note 53 supra. 
"' A state court determination of dischargeability does not make the dischargeability 
issue res judicata for the bankruptcy court. See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979); In 
re Williams, 3 Bankr. Rep. 401 (Bankr. Ct. N.D. Ga. 1980). But see In re Peterman, 5 
Bankr. Rep. 687 (Bankr. Ct. E.D. Pa. 1980) . 
.. See In re Warner, 5 Bankr. Rep. 434, 442 (Bankr. Ct. D. Utah 1980) (when the 
court reviews prepetition alimony claims it should examine the changed circumstances of 
the debtor and ex-spouse since the divorce decree; "unless at the time of filing there 
exists a present need" of the ex-spouse to receive alimony that is "reasonably necessary" 
the claim should be discharged); accord, In re Lovett, 6 Bankr. Rep. 270,272 (Bankr. Ct. 
D. Utah 1980) ("Additionally, evidence of changed circumstances since the entry of the 
decree and up to the filing of the bankruptcy must be considered to determine whether a 
debt originally imposed to discharge a support obligation fulfills a present need for sup-
port."). See also In re Fox, 5 Bankr. Rep. 317 (Bankr. Ct. N.D. Tex. 1980) (court re-
viewed earning capacity of the parties, their need, timing of the payments, and applica-
ble state law to determine the dischargeability of prepetition alimony); In re Sturgell, 7 
Bankr. Rep. 59, 62 (Bankr. Ct. S.D. Ohio 1980); In re Williams, 3 Bankr. Rep. 401 
(Bankr. Ct. N.D. Ga. 1980). 
An example of such a review of past alimo_ny was given at the House hearings: 
Let us take the situation - let us say that the man was an automobile dealer in 
an agency handling a fairly large type of automobiles. The trends change. Prior 
to the change in the trends, the family had certain wealth. Domestic problems 
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to modify only future alimony because he has satisfied all prepe-
tition claims, the possibility is remote. In modification cases, 
therefore, the bankruptcy court will most likely review both 
prepetition and postpetition alimony in relation to the debtor's 
and ex-spouse's present needs. The bankruptcy court's fact-find-
ing process provides all of the information the court needs to 
project future needs and incomes for modification of future 
alimony. 
Given this similarity of fact-finding and the authority of the 
bankruptcy court to modify prepetition alimony, bankruptcy 
courts should exercise jurisdiction to modify chapter 13 debtors' 
alimony payments. Judicial economy would be enhanced by 
lightening the congestion of state court dockets, and the debtor 
would not be burdened with unnecessary expense and delay.119 
Additionally, the court would be able to provide the debtor with 
an effective interim fresh start by resolving his total financial 
situation. Finally, this expanded jurisdiction would enable the 
court to accomplish more effectively the principal goal of the 
Bankruptcy Code, which is to provide adequate relief for con-
sumer debtors.80 
B. Objections to Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction of Alimony 
Modification 
There are two significant arguments against bankruptcy court 
jurisdiction to modify alimony payments. The first is that the 
Bankruptcy Code itself provides an alternative for chapter 13 
debtors who cannot pay their alimony: conversion to chapter 7 
liquidation. The second argument, which rests· on principles of 
federalism, is that federal courts should not invade a long-recog-
nized area of special state concern. Analysis of these arguments 
come along, and so they get divorced. The usual type of settlement we are talk-
ing about is one in which the business is awarded to the husband, and, because 
that provides a disparity in value, the wife is awarded money payments to make 
up the difference. Business then changes. The husband goes into bankruptcy. He 
no longer has the asset that was the source of the wealth. He has an obligation to 
pay alimony and support. That is what is considered to be needed for the wife's 
support. But he is also asked to pay, under this new proposal, a share for assets 
that he no longer has. By and large, with that type of settlement, I think he 
cannot make the payment . . . . 
In my view, this is a division of former wealth, of no longer existent wealth. 
Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on 
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, pt. I, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess. 303-04 (1975) (testimony of Daniel R. Cowans). 
•• See note 36 supra. 
00 See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 4. 
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will reveal, however, that neither has substantial merit. Conver-
sion to chapter 7 would frustrate a defined national policy. And, 
with respect to the second argument, state interests in alimony 
modification are not overriding, and, in fact, are far outweighed 
by the benefits to be realized from consolidation of the chapter 
13 case and the alimony modification case in one court. 
1. The alternative of liquidation- It can be argued that if a 
chapter 13 debtor cannot pay both alimony and the claims of 
other creditors the chapter 13 case should be converted to a 
chapter 7 liquidation case to discharge all prepetition debts and 
to enable full payment of alimony.e1 This argument assumes 
that the modification request is an attempt to circumvent ali-
mony payments, which are primary, nondischargeable obliga-
tions in bankruptcy.e2 Modification, however, should not be 
equated with discharge. Bankruptcy discharge releases the 
debtor from further personal liability on his prebankruptcy 
debts.es Alimony modification applies only to future alimony, 
which is a postpetition debt to which the concept of discharge is 
inapplicable. As to the primary importance of the debtor paying 
alimony, the debtor could similarly "avoid" payment by filing 
for modification in state court. 
More importantly, however, mandatory conversion to chapter 
7 in lieu of modification in chapter 13 would contravene Con-
gress' stated policy of encouraging qualified individuals to file in 
chapter 13 before resorting to chapter 7. 84 The debtor benefits 
by filing in chapter 13 rather than chapter 7 through greater 
protection of his assets and credit standing, the avoidance of the 
stigma of straight bankruptcy, and the financial stability of a 
carefully planned budget. Creditors benefit through greater pay-
ment of their claims.e11 Forcing the debtor into chapter 7, where 
"[b]oth the debtor and his creditors are the losers,"88 automati-
cally denies him these benefits and contravenes the pro-chapter 
13 policy. It also denies a debtor the benefits of the flexibility of 
•• See In re Garrison, 5 Bankr. Rep. 256, 260 (Bankr. Ct. E.D. Mich. 1980). 
•• See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 129; 1977 Hearings, supra note 10, at 685 
(statement of Bankruptcy Judge Joe Lee). See also H.R. REP. No. 1195, 96th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 15 (1980) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1195) . 
.. H. MILLER & M. COOK, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT 389 
(1979) . 
.. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 118 ("The premises of the bill with respect to 
consumer bankruptcy are that use of the bankruptcy law should be a last resort; that, if 
it is used, debtors should attempt repayment under chapter 13 .... "). 
•• Id. 
.. 123 CONG. REC. 35,446 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Edwards). 
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a chapter 13 plan.67 
Additionally, fairness dictates that the court consider all fac-
tors relevant to the debtor's circumstances. The bankruptcy 
court has broad discretion in determining the reasonable needs 
and expenses of the debtor and his dependents. By compelling 
liquidation in response to a modification request, the court de-
nies itself the right to investigate the debtor's entire financial 
situation. Consequently, the debtor may go through bankruptcy 
with his financial problems unresolved. For example, the debtor 
might be unable to pay unmodified alimony even after liquida-
tion and discharge. By forcing the debtor into liquidation in 
such circumstances the bankruptcy court would fail to fulfill its 
statutory obligation of resolving the debtor's entire financial sit-
uation and providing adequate relief.68 
2. Federalism concerns- In modifying alimony, bankruptcy 
courts would have to apply domestic relations law, which has 
traditionally been reserved for state courts. 69 The limitation on 
federal court jurisdiction is far from absolute, however, and a 
federal court must weigh several variables in determining 
whether to exercise jurisdiction in this area. 70 The underlying 
foundation of the domestic relations limitation rests on policy 
considerations which include the state interest in the suit, the 
state court's special competence in domestic relations, other 
than its presumed ability to interpret state law, and the continu-
ing nature of the controversy.71 
a. State interest in domestic relations- Bankruptcy courts 
have refused to modify alimony or child support payments on 
the ground that there is an "overriding" state interest in such 
matters; however, none of these cases has dealt with a chapter 
87 The plan may divide creditors into separate classes, with each class receiving pay-
ment of different percentages of their claims. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a)(3), (b) (Supp. III 
1979). A plan that provides for 100% payment of modified alimony but 0% of unsecured 
creditors' claims is acceptable if made in good faith. Cf. the following cases in which the 
court confirmed plans paying unsecured creditors nothing while paying secured creditors 
all or part of their claims: In re Garcia, 6 Bankr. Rep. 35 (Bankr. Ct. D. Kan. 1980); In re 
Stollenwerck, 5 Bankr. Rep. 616 (Bankr. Ct. M.D. Ala. 1980); In re Roy, 5 Bankr. Rep. 
611 (Bankr. Ct. M.D. Ala. 1980). See also In re Haag, 3 Bankr. Rep. 649 (Bankr. Ct. D. 
Ore. 1980) (court approved chapter 13 plan providing for 100% payment of child support 
and 25% payment of other creditors); H.R. REP. No. 1195, supra note 66, at 25-26 
(1980). But see Note, Filing for Personal Bankruptcy: Adoption of a "Bona Fide Effort" 
Test Under Chapter 13, 14 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 321 (1981). 
18 See notes 59-60 and accompanying text supra. 
" See notes 19-22 and accompanying text supra. 
•• See notes 23-26 and accompanying text supra. 
" See Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486, 487-88 (5th Cir. 1978). 
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13 debtor who requests modification of alimony payments.72 At 
any rate, the argument that state interest in alimony modifica-
tion is "overriding" lacks merit. 
First, uniform bankruptcy law is a strong federal interest ex-
pressed in the Constitution. 78 With the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 
Congress has mandated that bankruptcy courts exercise the 
broadest possible jurisdiction to implement bankruptcy law.74 
· Effective implementation of chapter 13 cannot be achieved un-
less bankruptcy courts exercise such jurisdiction. 
Second, state law guides bankruptcy judges in their actions, 
preventing modification "willy-nilly."711 The bankruptcy judge, 
in confirming the chapter 13 plan, applies a bankruptcy test of 
needs and expenses; but the judge would have to apply a state 
test for alimony modification. The fear that the federal standard 
•• See In re Garrison, 5 Bankr. Rep. 256 (Bankr. Ct. E.D. Mich. 1980) (court held it 
lacked jurisdiction to modify child support payments of a chapter 13 debtor; dictum that 
same was true for alimony payments); In re Universal Profile, Inc., 6 Bankr. Rep. 194 
(Bankr. Ct. N.D. Ga. 1980) (court held it lacked jurisdiction to modify alimony and child 
support payments of third-party defendant in chapter 11 case who made modification 
motion in counterclaim against non-debtor defendant); Hernandez v. Borgos, 343 F.2d 
802 (1st Cir. 1965) (under the Bankruptcy Act court held it could not modify support 
payments and refused to confirm plan of chapter XII debtor that provided for monthly 
amount less than that needed to cover support payments). See also In re Daiker, 5 
Bankr. Rep. 348, 352 (Bankr. Ct. D. Minn. 1980), a proceeding to determine dis-
chargeability of debts under a divorce decree, in which the court stated: 
Additionally, presenting evidence bearing upon the relative equities of the par-
ties' economic positions by including facts relating to the present income of one 
of the parties addresses an issue beyond that which this court must determine; 
such proof is more relevant to the modification of the state court's decree and 
should be addressed to the proper forum, the [local] County Court. 
Similar objections were raised in Congress. A dissenter to the House Report said: 
The balance between federal and state jurisdiction should not lightly be brushed 
side [sic], not only in the interests of federal-state comity, but also due to the 
relative inelasticity of [the] federal judicial system. The federal system has only 
one pyramid, the states have together fifty. As presently drafted, the bill pours 
all sort of litigation into the federal system that belongs in the state courts, and 
the bankruptcy courts would, in addition, end up deciding all kinds of cases only 
tangentially related to the bankruptcy laws. In the latter event, bankruptcy ex-
pertise is irrelevant and bankruptcy judges are not likely to be well trained in 
these other fields. 
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 544 (Separate Additional Views of Hon. George E. 
Danielson) (quoting Judge Shirley M. Hufstedler). 
73 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
•• See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 445. 
76 See In re Garrison, 5 Bankr. Rep. 256, 260 (Bankr. Ct. E.D. Mich. 1980) (court 
refused to modify chapter 13 debtor's child support obligation), in which the court 
states: 
Nor was it the intent of the new Bankruptcy Code to convert the bankruptcy 
courts into family or domestic relations courts-courts that would in tum, willy-
nilly, modify divorce decrees of state courts insofar as these courts had previous-
ly fixed the amount of alimony and child support obligations of debtors. 
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would swallow the state standard is unfounded if bankruptcy 
judges balance the two standards based on the best interests of 
the debtor, his dependents, the ex-spouse receiving alimony, and 
the creditors. This balancing can be achieved effectively only by 
one judge; and the bankruptcy judge is in the better position to 
do it. 76 This is because the bankruptcy judge would have juris-
diction over the entire bankruptcy proceeding, whereas the state 
court would not. If the bankruptcy and state courts both partici-
pate, either a vicious circle of modification results or one court 
effectively preempts action by the other.77 
A third reason why state interest is not overriding is that ali-
mony is becoming increasingly contractual in nature. Although 
marriage itself is a contract, courts have long held that it creates 
a relationship between the parties that is more than merely con-
tractual. 78 Consequently, alimony has traditionally been viewed 
as a general duty of support based on the special relationship 
between husband and wife, rather than a contractual obliga-
tion. 79 While this may have been an appropriate policy when so-
ciety regarded the husband as the head of the family,80 the 
growing role of women outside the home, changing property law, 
and the movement for women's equality are causing modern ju-
risprudence to reject this concept of women's subordinate role.81 
As a result, the traditional alimony rationales of the husband's 
duty of support and punishment for fault are also being re-
jected. 82 Replacing these outdated notions is the standard that 
alimony is to be awarded only if the needs of the payee spouse 
warrant, and then only because the spouse needs time to or can-
not support herself or himself.88 The modern policy is to en-
71 See text following note 44 supra. 
71 See notes 36-37 and accompanying text supra. 
'" E.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1888); UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 
ACT § 201. But see Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 
62 VA. L. REv. 663 (1976); Weitzman, Legal Regulations of Marriage: Tradition and 
Change, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 1169 (1974). 
" Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904) (holding alimony nondischargeable in 
bankruptcy because not a contractual debt); accord, Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U.S. 340 
(1903). 
80 See Weitzman, supra note 66, at 1172-97. 
81 Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); see Note, Financial Equality in Marriage and 
Parenthood: Sharing the Burdens as Well as the Benefits, 29 CATH U.L. REv. 733 
(1980). 
0 See, e.g., UNIFORM ~GB AND DIVORCE ACT § 308(b); Gillman, Alimony/Spousal 
Support: From Punishment to Rehabilitation, 7 COMMUNITY PROP. J. 135 (1980); Weitz-
man & Dixon, The Alimony Myth: Does No-Fault Divorce Make a Difference?, 14 FAM. 
L.Q. 141, 148 (1980). 
0 E.g., In re Marriage of Morrison, 20 Cal. 3d 437, 451-53, 537 P.2d 41, 50-52, 143 Cal. 
Rptr. 139, 148-50 (1978); see L. FoLBY & T. McMII.LIAN, FAMILY LAw 111 (1976); Glen-
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courage alimony based on a separation agreement, which can be 
enforced as a contract:84 The result of these factors is that ali-
mony is no different from other contractual obligations that the 
bankruptcy court must examine and enforce. Thus, the court 
should treat alimony no differently when considering the extent 
of its jurisdiction. 
b. The state court's special competency in domestic rela-
tions- The argument that state courts have special competency 
to adjudicate modification of alimony payments of chapter 13 
debtors is without merit. Bankruptcy courts routinely engage in 
fact-finding that is virtually identical to the fact-finding in-
volved in a modification proceeding.86 
Bankruptcy judges are specialists in resolving the financial 
affairs of petitioners, whether they be individual debtors, corpo-
rations, partnerships, or municipalities. Although bankruptcy 
judges do not deal with intrafamily disputes to the same extent 
as do judges in state domestic relations courts, they are ex-
perienced in uncovering assets and determining the validity of 
claims against those assets. Since alimony modification is basi-
cally a financial issue and bankruptcy judges have expertise in 
such matters, the decisionmaking required would not be beyond 
their expertise. 
c. Continuing nature of the controversy- The argument for 
federal abstention is strongest where it can be expected that the 
case will require continuing supervision over an extended period 
of time. If custody, parental rights, or child support are in-
volved, the debtor's request for alimony modification might be 
only one in an extended series of requests as the circumstances 
of the debtor's family evolve. After investigating the case, defer-
ence to the continuing role of the state court would probably call 
for the bankruptcy court's not exercising jurisdiction in such cir-
cumstances. 88 In the same way, if an agreement exists to litigate 
the modification question in the state courts, the bankruptcy 
court should refrain from exercising jurisdiction until it can de-
termine the reasons for the agreement and whether such re-
straint is in the best interests of the parties. 
don, supra note 78, at 706-07; Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 82, at 148-50. 
84 See UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 306 & Commissioners' Note. 
9• See notes 47-60 and accompanying text supra. 
88 As an example of a continuing role with regard to child support payments, in Michi-
gan child support payments are collected and supervised by the Friend of the Court, who 
has the authority to petition the state court for a modification of support if changed 
economic or financial conditions warrant modification. MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 552.251, 
.252a (1970). 
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In these types of cases the line between the bankruptcy 
court's not acting because it lacks jurisdiction and not acting be-
cause it is following the abstention principle often blurs.87 Spe-
cifically, the court may hold that the continuing nature of the 
other controversy precludes a finding that the connection be-
tween that proceeding and the bankruptcy case is sufficient to 
bring it within the court's jurisdiction. On the other hand, the 
court may decide that it has jurisdiction but the controversy's 
continuing nature requires it to abstain. Thus, courts have ab-
stained where the bankruptcy petition was filed while simultane-
ous state proceedings were being followed and the unstated 
threat existed that the debtor was seeking to play one court 
against the other. 88 
The preceding discussion leads to the conclusion that the do-
mestic relations limitation on federal court jurisdiction should 
not bar a bankruptcy court from modifying a chapter 13 debtor's 
alimony payments. Federal interests in providing uniform, effi-
cient and effective bankruptcy relief clearly outweigh state inter-
est in maintaining exclusive jurisdiction to modify alimony. In 
addition, the bankruptcy court is the proper forum for modifica-
tion of a chapter 13 debtor's alimony because the bankruptcy 
court, unlike the state court, is competent to deal with the 
debtor's total financial situation. However, in a situation where 
it can be expected that continuing court supervision will be re-
quired beyond the life of the debtor's plan, e.g., where child sup-
port or custody is involved, the bankruptcy court might properly 
choose to def er jurisdiction to the state court. 89 
.., 28 U.S.C. §1471(d) (Supp. III 1979). This section codifies the decision in Thompson 
v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940), where no statutes nor previous decisions 
were clearly applicable to the property question involved. The Court held that it was 
more appropriate for the state court to decide the issue. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra 
note 6, at 446. 
88 Cf. In re Moore, 5 Bankr. Rep. 67 (Bankr. Ct. N.D. Tex. 1980) (State court awarded 
a wife farm land in a divorce settlement, but her husband appealed and entered the land. 
The wife sought a restraining order, but the husband filed a chapter 13 petition and 
sought removal. The bankruptcy court stated it had jurisdiction but would abstain on 
the basis of comity and federalism.); In re Jewel Terrace Corp., 3 Bankr. Rep. 36 (Bankr. 
Ct. E.D.N.Y. 1980) (debtor bought apartment building with knowledge of tenants' strike 
and state court proceeding; court found it in best interests of all concerned not to oust 
state court of jurisdiction and therefore abstained). 
80 But even child support is based on financial considerations, and these may be so 
crucial to the bankruptcy case that they could outweigh any continuing state interest. 
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Bankruptcy courts now have jurisdiction over all matters "re-
lated to" the bankruptcy case. Alimony modification is suffi-
ciently connected to a chapter 13 case to satisfy this jurisdic-
tional standard. Although state concerns regarding the intrusion 
of federal courts are valid, they do not outweigh the federal in-
terest in uniform and efficient bankruptcy relief. Giving effective 
relief to the debtor and promoting judicial economy require the 
bankruptcy court to exercise its jurisdiction over alimony modi-
fication proceedings related to a chapter 13 case. 
-Peter Swiecicki 
